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In “Evidence for Fundamentality?” Jonathan Schaffer argues against the view that there is an ultimate fundamental level to the world.  Seeing that quarks and leptons may have an infinite hierarchy of constituents, he claims, “empowers and dignifies the whole of nature” (15).  Like Kant (recall the Third Antinomy) he holds that there are as good reasons for believing matter infinitely divisible as composed of fundamental simples, although he often suggests that there is in fact more evidence for the former than the latter.  

I’m afraid that Schaffer’s provocative arguments have not convinced me.  In particular, I don’t know why a fundamental layer of entities would weaken and denigrate the whole of nature; his arguments for agnosticism between a fundamental level and an infinite hierarchy of levels (let’s call this ‘infinite descent’) do not seem compelling; nor do I see how an infinite hierarchy could do the work Schaffer wants it to do.  Schaffer has does us a service, however, for stimulating this opportunity to scrutinize this so little studied and yet so common assumption.

1. Preliminaries.  The definition of fundamentalism.  Schaffer can of course define fundamentalism however he likes.  But if the definition makes the doctrine uninteresting (say, because it’s trivially false) or is phrased in a tendentious way, then it is appropriate to criticize it.  He defines a fundamental level as a level of “entities that have no parts” (3), and a level is cashed out in terms of a mereological structure.  I have two comments about this definition.

First, Schaffer is worried that fundamentalism preaches that all entities of higher levels are “merely derivative, if real at all” (abstract); he suggests that it says that human organisms, macroentities like tables and chairs, and other beings that we cherish dearly are in fact unreal.  Does it?  Fundamentalists don’t believe that there are different entities at different levels.  Rather, there is one real entity, say a table, and it can be described in various different ways: a coarse-grained way useful when looking for a place to eat, a more fine-grained way when using a magnifying lens, an even more fine-grained way when using electron microscopes, etc., until in principle we reach a finest grain.  But the chair and collection of atoms are one entity equally real.  Fundamentalists don’t advocate the nineteenth century or Neoplatonic idea of degrees of Being.  So I think it’s misleading for Schaffer to speak as he does.  Worse, if this alleged implication is the main reason for writing the paper my first worry is that it’s misguided.  Would I be “less real” if science rallied around a particular fundamental theory?  Of course not. 
 
Second, Schaffer ties fundamentalism essentially to atoms, fundamental particles.  Yet to do this is to perhaps make the thesis trivially false.  For the fundamental theory of matter in science today is quantum field theory, a theory that, as the name suggests, posits ontologically primitive fields.  Surprisingly, Schaffer does not acknowledge this.  He quotes various physicists talking about particles, and apparently he thinks that they’re really talking about particles and not fields.  But these physicists are almost certainly speaking of particles as shorthand for (loosely speaking) localized clumps of field or “field quanta” as Paul Teller puts it.  Quantum field theory posits fundamental fields, a claim which is nonsense on Schaffer’s sense of fundamental.​[1]​  (Speaking of fields, Schaffer writes that they are the least favorable case for fundamentalism (8).)  Fields are, it is true, characterized by an infinite number of degrees of freedom.  They are in some sense infinitely divisible.  But surely to think of a bottom level of fields as at all problematic for fundamentalism is to mistake a “horizontal” infinity for a “vertical” one.

Rather than let fundamentalism collapse because of definition, let’s understand it loosely as the claim that there is an ultimate level of primitive particles, fields, … whatever, which does not itself supervene upon anything else for its properties.  The fundamental level is the ultimate subvenient base, whatever it is.

2. Does Science Support Fundamentalism or an Infinite Hierarchy?  Schaffer’s official position seems to be that we ought to be agnostic between our two hypotheses.  However, in his discussion of the history of science he appears to suggest that in fact the weight of evidence is against fundamentalism and for an infinite hierarchy.  Before turning to the question of agnostism, I would like to briefly address this point.

Does science support fundamentalism?  Science has always gone for fundamentalism, so the answer to this question seems a quick yes.  That is, scientists (in what is recognizably science) have almost always gone for a fundamental level.  Newton, LaPlace, Maxwell, Clausius, Einstein, Witten, and company have always posited a fundamental level.

However, Schaffer notes that science has changed and is likely not yet finished.  In many cases science has progressed (he is not espousing the so-called ‘pessimistic metainduction’ against scientific realism) by positing deeper structure.  

First, let’s be clear that many of these shifts in science are not changes due to deeper structure; rather they are often motivated by unification or replacement and do not abandon one level in favor of a lower level one.  For instance, dropping caloric for molecular motion due to Joule’s experiments is not so much going to a deeper level—scientists were already committed to molecules in motion—as a kind of elimination driven by unification.  Replacing Newton’s gravitational force with a spacetime metric (specifically, geodesic deviation) is another example.  And indeed, even in string theory, which Schaffer mentions, we have a very novel type of ontological unification, one not really suiting Schaffer’s needs.  Strings would not be the constituents of quarks, for instance, in the same way that quarks are constituents of protons, or that protons are constituents of atoms.  Strings, rather, would simply be (in the sense of identity) quarks and electrons, depending upon the vibrational mode of the string.  We couldn’t divide the electron and find a bunch of strings.  When you reflect on the history and current practice of science, therefore, you notice that the number of changes due to deeper structure is a relatively small subset of the number of changes total.  

What is it exactly that suggests an infinite descent?  Is it the disagreement among scientists about what counts as the fundamental level?  This won’t work since fundamentalists wouldn’t expect anything different.  That science was not born complete and universally accurate does not support the hypothesis that quarks have an actual infinity of constituents.  Is it evidence against fundamentalism that Thales posited water rather than quarks and leptons?  Disagreement may be a source of skepticism regarding any particular fundamental level, but this is no different than the pessimistic meta-induction.  

Is it then a meta-induction on the fact that scientists have in some cases inferred that there exists deeper structure?  That would be an unwarranted inductive inference of the wildest sort, comparable to Schaffer asking me for chocolates from a box I have, receiving them 5 times, and then concluding that I must have an infinity of chocolates.  Furthermore, think of all the length scales to which we haven’t needed to postulate anything new!  The Standard Model (that is, the electro-weak theory and quantum chromodynamics plus quark interactions) has arguably been tested all the way down to 10-18 cm.  Most of the moves to deeper structure happened at the very low energy end of this; so for most of the levels of energy we have been able to probe, no changes have been necessary.  And there are no observational or theoretical reasons that I know of for thinking that there will be any change below 10-33cm.

Neither of these arguments teased from Schaffer’s discussion of the history of science, therefore, is sufficiently weighty to overturn the simple fact that science has (virtually) always gone for a fundamental level.  The history of science does not support an infinite decent more than fundamentalism—if anything, quite the opposite.

3. Physicalism.  Does an infinite descent “empower and dignify the whole of nature”?  The key to it achieving this surprising consequence is the alleged inability of defining nasty doctrines such as Humean supervenience and physicalism if there is an infinite descent.  I’ll grant that in an infinite descent model these doctrines will need to be reformulated, but I don’t believe the model accomplishes what Schaffer wants.  

The crucial point is that we still have asymmetric dependence between levels in an infinite descent.  Schaffer in fact admits (p. 12) that physicalism survives to the extent that the mental may still depend on the neurochemical in some sense, even if there is no bottom layer.  In general, it’s compatible with an infinite hierarchy that one makes all sorts of relative judgments of asymmetric dependency.  And he says that it may be true (but redundant) that “everything is, in some sense, nothing over and above the subatomic and below” (12).  Isn’t this enough to generate the so-called problem of overdetermination?

Consider an aspirin’s ability to relieve headaches.  If an aspirin and a biochemical being like me are nothing over and above their atomic and chemical composition, then it’s plausible that every headache-relieving event is the cause of some atomic and chemical event.  If every atomic event has a sufficient atomic cause—and nothing Schaffer has said threatens this—and if few if any events are overdetermined, we then have all the premises of the overdetermination argument and can conclude that the aspirin, at the level of aspirins, is causally impotent.

Schaffer’s attack on this argument is very brief (one paragraph, p. 14).  The basic idea is this.  Consider levels L1, L2, L3…, where L1 is the highest level and all succeeding levels are lower levels.  The overdetermination argument operates on the assumption that (say) L2’s being nothing over and above L3 motivates something along the lines of Kim’s causal inheritance principle, that higher levels and thus L2 inherit their causal powers from lower levels and hence L3.  Between any two levels I can now run this argument, depriving the higher level of its independent causal powers.  Schaffer’s point is now that we can repeat this argument at every level, and if the descent is infinite, then all causal powers “must drain away down a bottomless pit” (14).

Schaffer’s quick reaction to this puzzles me.  He says that this conclusion is absurd and I suppose takes it as a reductio of the overdetermination argument.  But it seems like the conclusion should be that the overdetermination argument needs addressing, for in a finite descent it strips causal potency away from higher-level entities and in an infinite descent it strips causal potency away from all entities.  What he has shown is that the overdetermination argument has worse consequences in an infinite descent, but that is all.  Showing that an argument has worse consequences than originally thought is not itself a solution to the problem.

Schaffer states that an infinite descent is an egalitarian metaphysic wherein all levels are fully real and causally potent.  The aspirin apparently simply has its causal powers qua aspirin, causal powers qua chemical compound, and the first in virtue of the second despite the first being nothing more than the second.  Our original puzzle hasn’t disappeared.  The problem of overdetermination does not hang on a finite number of levels, waiting to be discharged by the trick of positing an infinite number of levels.  The problem is rather the expression of a tension between two seemingly plausible claims, the idea that entities do what they do because their constituents (and relationships among them) make them do it and the idea that there is genuine higher-level determination.  When coupled to the idea that there is no overdetermination, there appears to be a inconsistency between these two claims, and Schaffer’s egalitarian metaphysic hasn’t discharged it.

The fundamental problem with an egalatarian metaphysic was spotted a long time ago in a completely different context by Gilbert and Sullivan in the Gondoliers:

“When every one is somebody, 
Then no one’s anybody!”

It’s nice to think that no level is metaphysically distinguished, but it’s hard to square this with the idea that some are nothing over and above others.

5. Towers of Quantum Field Theories.  Here I would just like to point out that Schaffer perhaps misses the best support he has in science by neglecting a recent debate concerning effective quantum field theories.  A quantum field theory can at one energy level approximate—for that energy level and lower—arbitrarily well another quantum field theory at a higher energy scale.  If one theory posits a particle of mass m, the other theory may, at energies below the scale set by this mass, calculate accurate physical quantities assuming that this particle does not exist (the particle enters as a non-renormalizable charge).  The first theory is said to be an effective quantum field theory for the second more fundamental one.  As the energy increases non-renormalizable effects in the effective theory grow in importance until the theory must be replaced by a new QFT with a new particle.

Recently, the prominent physicist Georgi 1989 has suggested that nature may continue like this.  At each step as the energy increases we may find that we must introduce a new QFT.  Continued infinitely, we would have an infinite tower of effective field theories, a prospect very congenial to Schaffer’s picture.  Actually, Georgi is not saying that nature is like this; rather he is merely cautioning us that the final complete theory, if there is one, may be very far away from our currently accessible energy scales.  The historians Cao and Schweber 1993, however, do indeed argue based on their understanding of the renormalization group that this is the way nature actually is.  Huggett and Weingard 1995 have criticized their argument, and many more commentators have discussed the issue.       

6. In Support of Fundamentalism.  Earlier I took issue with Schaffer’s argument that science in fact does not support fundamentalism, claiming that as an historical fact it has.  But I didn’t say it did so with good reason.  I will now do this.

Let me first admit that it is of course logically possible that there is an infinite hierarchy of levels.  Let me also grant with Kant that we can never adduce evidence foreclosing an infinite hierarchy or a level of fundamental simples (though see Kelly 1996).  We’ll never actually produce accelerators able to test every possible energy level. 

But rational belief doesn’t end with a sketch of logical possibilities.  Is an epistemology plausible if it calls for agnosticism between two hypotheses simply on the basis of not being able to decisively rule out one?  I take it that we have no evidence against the claim that there are now very light, neutrally charged purple monsters that everywhere pop into existence when no one (and no camera, etc.) is looking.  And we have no evidence against the claim that Newton’s force, F, is really an infinity of tiny forces, G, H, I, J…, that always act in concert with one another so as to fool detectors into thinking that there is only one force, F.  Should we remain agnostic about such hypotheses or should we be atheists?  This is a long-standing issue in epistemology, so we cannot go deeply into it here, but my feeling is that such a strong form of agnosticism cannot be defended.

Looked at from the point of view of scientific methodology, there is a striking asymmetry between our two hypotheses about the structure of nature.  The obvious point to make is that a theory appealing to only a finite descent is far simpler than an infinite descent model.  Simplicity is perhaps the cardinal theoretical virtue of scientific theories.  Scientists try to discover maximally powerful and simple theories.  Simplicity plays (and rightly so) a strong methodological or heuristic role in science.  What is simplicity?  Who knows?  On any discussion of simplicity I have ever seen, an infinite hierarchy of entities and theories of those entities doesn’t count as simple.  

But simplicity may be a red herring here anyway.  The fundamental problem is that we shouldn’t posit what we don’t have evidence to posit.  Schaffer’s theory needs a shave from a certain medieval nominalist.  Schaffer is not supposing that there is some phenomenon that quantum field theory cannot account for, a phenomenon requiring the existence of lower levels.  The infinity of levels below quantum field theory are completely redundant.  There is no phenomenon (broadly construed) that their existence would explain.  Isn’t positing such entities, an actual infinity of them at that, committing the gravest sin one can in scientific methodology?   As Newton said, “Nature does not affect the pomp of superfluous causes.”  This is not a priori true, but rather it seems supported by the history of science.

But there may be stronger reasons for believing this, as Eric Barnes 2000 has recently proposed..  





because H1 entails the evidence E.  I is thus completely unconfirmed by E. Now, should we be agnostic between H1 and H2?  As Barnes says, only a “naïve confirmational holism” would demand this (p. 366).​[2]​    
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^1	  Of course, there is a debate about whether quantum field theory can be given a particle interpretation; but this is an uphill battle for fans of particles due in part to the hardness of interpreting, for example, superpositions of states with different numbers of particles or the energy of the zero-particle ground state.
^2	   Though there may be better reasons to prefer H1 to H2, as Barnes thinks, we can point out with Sober that even though P(E/H1) = P(E/H2), the P(H1) > P(H2) since H2 implies H1 and H1 doesn’t imply H2.  
